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"Head-of-State-Owned Enterprise"
Immunity
Pammela S. Quinn*
ABSTRACT

While other wealthy individuals and businessmen have
served and do serve as heads of state, the Trump presidency
appears to be unique in terms of the global scope of the
President's business interests, his propensity to be sued, and his
disinterest in disentangling his business interests from his
official agenda. This Article conceptualizes Trump's many
business holdings and licenses under the Trump Organization
International umbrella as a "head-of-state-owned enterprise."
This raises issues similar to cases involving both head-of-state
and state-owned enterprise immunity. Considering existing
immunity doctrines, including gaps and contested areas in the
law pertaining to them, the Article identifies unique immunity
questions that are likely to arise in connection with lawsuits
against both President Trump and the Trump Organization
during his time in office and beyond.
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INTRODUCTION

Among the overwhelming number of stories that emerged
following the election of Donald J. Trump and during the first one
hundred days of the Trump presidency were news accounts noting the
large number of lawsuits filed against the new US President. In just
his first eleven days in office, Trump had been sued some forty-two
times.' A few days later, the count was above fifty-compared with
three to four lawsuits each filed against the three previous presidents
over the same time frame. 2 While these suits challenge his official
policies as well as his personal conduct, 3 being named as a defendant

1.
Eliott C. McLaughlin, Trump's First Days in Office Spawn Dozens of
Lawsuits, CNN (Feb. 1, 2017, 8:54 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/31/us/trump2017)
(last
visited
Aug.
27,
lawsuits-travel-ban-conflicts-interest/
[https://perma.cc/AHX8-BKRS] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).
2.
See Phil McCausland, Trump Named in More Than 50 Lawsuits Since
Inauguration, NBC NEWS (Feb. 2, 2017, 5:28 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/trump-named-more-50-lawsuits-inauguration-n716191
(last visited Aug. 27,
2017) [https://perma.cclN99G-7K4K] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).
3.
See, e.g., Complaint to Establish and Enforce Mechanic's Lien, at ¶ 18, AES
Electrical d/b/a Freestate Electrical Construction Co. v. Trump'Old Post Office LLC,
Complaint No.
2017-CA-000369-R(RP)
(D.C.
Super.
Ct. Jan.
19, 2017),
http://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000159-d693-dd4c-abf9-ffbb289fOOOO (last visited Aug.
26, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4JKC-9XNR]
(archived Aug. 26, 2017) [hereinafter
Mechanics' Lien]; Press Release, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington,
CREW
Sues
Trump
Over
Emoluments
(Jan.
22,
2017),
http://www.citizensforethics.org/press-release/crew-sues-trump-emoluments/
(last
visited Aug. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cclP4H4-NZX2] (archived Aug. 25, 2017)
[hereinafter Emoluments]; Chris Sommerfeldt, Trump's Muslim Ban Excludes
Countries Linked to His Businesses, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 1, 2017, 3:06 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.comlnews/politics/trump-muslim-ban-excludes-countrieslinked-businesses-article-1.2957956 (subscription required) (last visited Aug. 28, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/SH2Z-XD6M] (archived Aug. 28, 2017) (discussing Trump's travel ban
and the absence of Muslim countries that Trump holds business interests in, despite
"deep-seated ties to terrorism") [hereinafter EO]; see also Tom Hamburger & Karen
Tumulty, CongressionalDemocrats to File Emoluments Lawsuit Against Trump, WASH.
POST
(June 14,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/congressionaldemocrats-to-file-emoluments-lawsuit-against-trump/2017/06/13/270e60e6-506d-11e7be25-3a519335381ctory.html?utmterm=.46e9eleffcl3 (last visited Aug. 27, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/LR8F-8HN4] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) (reporting that another
emoluments lawsuit will be filed nearly six months after the first one, this one on
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is nothing new for Donald Trump. As of June 2016, Trump had been
sued dozens of times and "more than 200 liens ha[d] been filed
against Trump or his businesses by contractors and employees dating
back to the 1980s." 4 At the same time, over the past thirty years,
Trump and his companies have been involved in 3,500 state and
federal lawsuits.5
A number of the recently filed lawsuits, both public and private,
relate to conduct that blurs the line between Trump's business and
political activities. The fact that the two are arguably inextricably
intertwined is the subject of one of the most high-profile public
lawsuits, citing the Emoluments Clause of the US Constitution6 and
alleging that Trump's unprecedented failure to "to divest from his
businesses [means that] he is now getting cash and favors from
foreign governments. . . . When Trump the president sits down to
behalf of approximately 200 Democratic Congressmen). Similarly, the First Lady,
Melania Trump, recently filed a defamation lawsuit in which she alleged that she was
injured by allegations she had engaged in sex work before marrying Trump, insofar as
she "had the unique, once-in-a-lifetime opportunity, as an extremely famous and wellknown person, as well as a former professional model and brand spokesperson, and
successful businesswoman, to launch a broad-based commercial brand in multiple
product categories, each of which could have garnered multi-million dollar business
relationships for a multi-year term [as First Lady] during which Plaintiff is one of the
most photographed women in the world. These product categories would have included,
among other things, apparel, accessories, shoes, jewelry, cosmetics, hair care, skin care
and fragrance." Laurel Wamsley, Melania Trump Lawsuit Argues 'Once In A Lifetime'
Chance To Make Millions Is Lost, NPR (Feb. 7, 2017, 6:33 PM) (quoting Complaint)
http://www.npr.org/2017/02/07/51397087 1/melania-trump-lawsuit-argues-once-in-alifetime-chance-to-make-millions-is-lost (subscription required) (last visisted Aug. 29,
2017) [https://perma.cc/57HY-AL3H] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) [hereinafter Melania
Trump Lawsuit].
4.
Dozens of Lawsuits Accuse Trump of Not Paying His Bills, Reports Claim,
Fox NEWS (June 10, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/06/10/dozenslawsuits-accuse-trump-not-paying-his-bills-reports-claim.html (subscription required)
(last visited Aug. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cclV9GM-JDS8] (archived Aug. 26, 2017); see
also McLaughlin, supra note 1 ("The high-profile wheeler and dealer filed numerous
lawsuits and faced an array of allegations of his own before stepping into the Oval
Office, including claims of sexual harassment, bilking investors and defrauding
students of his eponymous university.").
5.
See Nick Penzenstadler & Susan Page, Exclusive: Trump's 3,500 Lawsuits
Unprecedented for a Presidential Nominee, USA TODAY (June 1, 2016),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/06/01/donald-trumplawsuits-legal-battles/84995854/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2017) [https://perma.cc/XFW62VRG] (archived Aug. 28, 2017). Of these, Trump is a plaintiff in approximately 1,900
and a defendant in 1,450. Id.
6.
Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution (sometimes
referred to as the "Title of Nobility Clause" or the "Emoluments Clause") provides that:
No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States: and no person holding
any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of the
Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind
whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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negotiate trade deals . . . the American people will have no way of
knowing whether he will also be thinking about the profits of Trump
the businessman."7
Similarly, in what appears on its face to be a purely private
lawsuit seeking payment from one of his companies, there are
allegations that Trump's new political office is entangled in his
business dealings. Alleging that payment was due on contracted-for
electrical work at Trump's new hotel in Washington, D.C., which was
performed on an accelerated work schedule, one suit seeking a
mechanic's lien asserts:
At the time of the [new Trump hotel's] "soft opening," Donald J. Trump,
President of Defendant, Trump Old Post Office, LLC, was a U.S. presidential
candidate and the "soft opening"' had to occur to permit Mr. Trump's nationally
televised campaign event from the Hotel on September 16, 2016, which was to
honor U.S. veterans. But for [Plaintiffs] acceleration of work and performance
8
of extra work on the Project, this event would not have been able to occur.

Both of these types of lawsuits, public and private, reflect the
significant attention that has been paid to the potential domestic law
implications of such entanglements. 9
Quite surprisingly, given the intense focus on and coverage of
these domestic law issues, little or no discussion has occurred yet
regarding the potential international law ramifications of Trump's
continuing stake in his worldwide business enterprise.iO Yet, for

7.
Emoluments, supra note 3.
8.
Mechanics' Lien, supra note 3.
9.
See, e.g., Emoluments, supra note 3; Joe Palazzolo & Jacob Gershman,
Q&A: How Ethics Laws Apply to Trump as President, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2017, 4:48
PM),
https://www.wsj.comlarticles/q-a-how-ethics-laws-apply-to-trump-as-president1484776128 (subscription required) (last visited Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cclY83G6AZ7] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) (stating, inter alia, that "[t]he president is bound by
federal statutes that prohibit bribery and illegal gratuities, or things of value given to
officials for the purpose of influencing them. The president is also subject to the federal
Stock Act, which bars insider trading by government officials, and a federal antinepotism law that bans government officials from appointing relatives to or employing
them in agencies controlled by the officials"); see also Chris Woodyard et al., Trump
Blasts Nordstrom After It Dumps Ivanka's Fashion Line, USA TODAY (Feb. 8, 2017,
12:02 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/moneyfbusiness/2017/02/08/trump-blastsnordstrom-tweet-over-daughter-ivanka/97644392/
(last visited Aug. 29, 2017)
[https://perma.ccl7BBV-ZQC5] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (documenting the President's
response to Nordstrom's dropping his daughter's fashion line and the ethical
implications of said response) [hereinafter Ivanka Trump Tweets].
10.
Susanne Craig & Eric Lipton, Trust Records Show Trump Is Still Closely
Tied
to
His
Empire,
N.Y.
TIMES,
at
Al
(Feb.
4,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/us/politics/donald-trump-business.html
(subscription required) (last visited Aug. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cclM7QE-HWF6]
(archived Aug. 26, 2017) (reporting that Trump has created a revocable trust and ceded
day-to-day control of his businesses to his eldest son, Donald J. Trump, Jr., and the
Trump Organization's chief financial officer, Allen H. Weisselberg, a type of trust that

2017]

HEAD-OF-STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE IMMUNITY

1069

many of the same reasons-involving the unprecedented nature of his
business holdings, which include real and intellectual property
holdings around the world, his propensity to be sued, and an
apparent interest in using his office to enhance his business holdings
and vice versa"-the Trump presidency might test under-theorized
and amorphous concepts within the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 12
This Article unpacks the potential issues and highlights the at
best thin treatment of the legal doctrines at their heart. But resolving
the many questions likely to arise is beyond its scope. Even its more
modest ambition proves to be a more challenging task than one might
expect given the relatively well-developed literature surrounding the
doctrines of head of state immunity and the commercial activity
exception to sovereign immunity that parallel and overlap-but
which do not seem to fully envelop-the phenomenon considered by
this Article, "head-of-state-owned enterprise" immunity.

means he "will receive reports on any profit, or loss, on his company as a whole, [and]
can revoke [the trustees'] authority at any time. . . . [he purpose of the Donald J.
Trump Revocable Trust is to hold assets for the 'exclusive benefit' of the president").
11.
See Danny Hakim & Sui-Lee Wee, From Trump the Nationalist, A Trail of
Global Trademarks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.coml
2017/02/2 1/business/donald-trump-trademarks-china.html (subscription required) (last
visited Aug. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cc/K5MT-T67E] (archived Aug. 26, 2017); Nick
Penzenstadler et al., Donald Trump: Three Decades, 4,095 Lawsuits, USA TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/pages/interactives/trump-lawsuits/ (last visited Aug. 27,
2017) [https://perma.cc/QK86-HQVH] (archived Aug. 27, 2017); THE TRUMP ORG.,
www.trump.com (last visited Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cclPUG8-3GA2] (archived
Aug. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Trump Website]; Jeremy Venook, Trump's Interest us.
ATLANTIC
(Aug.
9,
2017),
Dubai
Edition,
THE
America's,
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/08/donald-trump-conflicts-ofinterests/508382/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/788X-Q3XG] (archived
Aug. 29, 2017); see also Linda Massarella, Trump Hotels See Boom in Bookings After
Election, N.Y. POST (Nov. 11, 2016, 1:25 AM), http://nypost.com/2016/11/11/trumpvisited
Aug.
27,
2017)
(last
hotels-see-boom-in-bookings-after-election/
[https://perma.cclVZS4-A6SF] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) (discussing a large increase in
reservations at Trump hotels); Richard Prez-Pefia & Rachel Abrams, Kellyanne
Conway Promotes Ivanka Trump Brand, Raising Ethics Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/us/politics/kellyanne-conway-ivanka2017),
trump-ethics.html? r=0 (subscription required) (last visited Aug. 28, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/K3DC-92BL] (archived Aug. 28, 2017); Ivanka Trump Tweets, supra
note 9; Melania Trump Lawsuit, supra note 3.
12.
See Keith Highet et al., Head-of-State Immunity--Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act--Suggestion by the Department of State, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 528, 531
(1994) (stating that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not well-settled in the United
States); see also Laurence R. Helfer & Timothy Meyer, The Evolution of Codification: A
Principal-Agent Theory of the International Law Commission's Influence, in CUSTOM'S
FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 305, 321 (Curtis Bradley ed.,
2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2585608 (subscription required) (last visited Aug. 28,
2017) [https://perma.cc/NB4V-C97Y] (archived Aug. 28, 2017); see also infra notes 7984 & accompanying text (discussing the extremely thin discussion of civil claims based
on financial/business interests in most discussions of the head of state immunity).
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While other wealthy individuals and businessmen have served
and do serve as heads of state,1 3 Donald Trump appears to be unique
in terms of the global scope of his business interests, particularly
because these business interests are in property (both real and
intellectual), increasing the likelihood that foreign courts would be
likely fora for lawsuits involving those businesses. Now that he has
assumed office, Trump's many business holdings and licenses under
the Trump International umbrella can be conceptualized as being at
least somewhat similar to a state-owned enterprise. That is, stateowned enterprises occupy a fuzzy space on the border of traditionally
public and traditionally private activity insofar as that enterprise is
created by a public entity to act on its (public) behalf-but not to
engage in traditionally public activities. Instead, state-owned
enterprises are specifically intended to carry out traditionally private
commercial activities. 14 Likewise, as the complaints about Trump's
failure to divest upon assuming the presidency suggest, Trump's
assumption of high public office has caused his private business
interests to become entangled with his public position in ways that
are often difficult to disaggregate.
Of course, the "head-of-state-owned enterprise"-the category
this Article uses to describe Trump-the-President's global business
holdings-is not a creature of existing doctrine. Looking at immunity
issues through the lens of this distinct categorization illuminates the
ways that existing doctrine fails to grapple with the consequences of
this private/public enterprise-and may need to be reconceptualized

13.
See Paul Owen, Who Are the Wealthiest World Leaders?, THE GUARDIAN
(Oct. 26, 2012, 9:48 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/blog/2012/oct/26/who-arethe-wealthiest-world-leaders (last visited Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.ccl3HNZ-ZDXT]
(archived Aug. 27, 2017); see also Silvio Berlusconi: Italy's Once-Untouchable Prime
Minister, BBC NEWS (June 14, 2016), http://www.bbc.comlnews/world-europe-11981754
(last visited Aug. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cclAQ5R-4SMV] (archived Aug. 26, 2017)
(discussing Berlusconi's extreme wealth alongside the fact that his "political career ran
in tandem with a litany of [domestic] legal battles").
14.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 applies to state-owned
enterprises as they are commonly known, though without using that term. Rather, the
Act covers those entities that meet the definition of what it refers to as "[a]n 'agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state'," defined as
any entity(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in
section 1332 (c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third
country.

28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2012).
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precisely because of this failure. To make this case, the Article is
structured as follows:
Part II describes the Trump International Organization,
including its scope and particular business holdings and interests it
has in various jurisdictions around the globe. It focuses on holdings
and interests in states where Trump has already become embroiled in
both diplomatic and legal controversies and in which potential
lawsuits are particularly likely to arise. 15
Part III canvasses the existing understanding of both sovereign
immunity (with particular attention to the commercial activities
exception to that doctrine) and head-of-state immunity. The origins of
head-of-state immunity as part and parcel of sovereign immunity and
the evolving understanding of the head of state as distinct and
separable from the sovereign are treated in detail to unpack the
competing rationales and conflicting contemporary approaches to this
doctrine.
Finally, Part IV considers the existing doctrine, including its
gaps and contested parameters, in light of the lawsuits described in
Part II. This Part describes the questions and challenges that are
likely to lie ahead for immunity in civil lawsuits against "head-ofstate-owned enterprises."

15.
Arguably, the fact that he has already reportedly done so in his first weeks
in office with respect to several of the most diehard political allies of the United States
suggests that almost any location is a potential trigger point for a lawsuit. See, e.g.,
Tara Palmeri et al., Trump's Faux-Pas Diplomacy, POLITICO (Feb. 8, 2017, 5:08 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump-foreign-leaders-phone-calls-234770
(last
visited Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/F6TR-U22L] (archived Aug. 27, 2017); Jake
Tapper et al., Trump Had Heated Exchange with Australian PM, Talked 'Tough
Hombres' with
Mexican
Leader,
CNN
(Feb.
2,
2017,
6:21
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/01/politics/malcolm-turnbull-donald-trump-pena-nieto/
(last visited Aug. 28, 2017) [https://perma.cc/P7U8-MR99] (archived Aug. 28, 2017); see
also Michael Birnbaum & Rick Noack, Germans Perplexed as Trump Escalates Feud,
WASH. POST (May 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/germansperplexed-as-trump-escalates-feud/2017/05/30/eeb30fdc-4552-11e7-8del2017)
(last visited Aug 26,
cec59a9bf4bl-story.html?utm-term=.fc632bceeeef
[https://perma.cc/EE3H-WQWV] (archived Aug. 26, 2017); Jon Stone, Donald Trump
Will Not Be Allowed to Address Parliament on UK State Visit, Says Speaker John
Bercow, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 6, 2017, 4:45 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/
politics/donald-trump-uk-state-visit-speaker-address-parliament-a7565651.html
(last
visited Aug. 28, 2019) [https://perma.cclR44R-XBME] (archived Aug. 28, 2017); Trump
Agrees to Honour "One China" Policy Despite Threats, BBC NEWS (Feb. 10, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38927891
(last visited Aug. 27, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/A55V-UDTD] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).
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HEAD-OF-STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE: THE TRUMP
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The Trump Organizationand Its InternationalHoldings

Because his companies are all privately owned, it is difficult to
discern the exact scope of Donald Trump's international business
holdings and interests. 16 In addition to approximately thirty domestic

Since December, the Trump Organization has updated its listings of its
16.
domestic and foreign subsidiaries. In December, the search yielded a listing of just
three "foreign" subsidiaries (of which two were in fact located in foreign states; the
other was located within Puerto Rico, a territory of the United States). As of February
10, 2017, as noted above, that has changed substantially. See The Trump Organization,
UNIWORLD (Feb. 10, 2017), http://uniworldonline.com/system/files/userfiles/2034/u8658-170210-104336-data.pdf (on file with the author) [hereinafter Uniworld
Document]. However, it appears that even the updated listing may not be up to date, as
it still lists Donald J. Trump as the Chairman and CEO. Other reports imply that
Trump has resigned, or intends to resign, those positions even though he still retains
an interest in the Organization through a Revocable Trust. See Craig & Lipton, supra
note 10; see also Trump Website, supra note 11 (listing Donald J. Trump as the
"Founder" of the Trump Organization). But, as of February 11, 2017, at least some
sources suggest that Trump and his older daughter Ivanka have not resigned their
CEO positions in some of their companies; this is despite, in his case, saying he was
turning over all his interests through the revocable trust and, in her case, announcing
a "formal leave of absence" from her brand businesses. See Derek Kravitz & Al Shaw,
Ivanka Trump Also Promised to Resign from the Family Business, But She Hasn't,
PACIFIC STANDARD
(Feb. 8, 2017), https://psmag.com/news/ivanka-trump-alsopromised-to-resign-from-the-family-business-but-she-hasnt (last visited Aug. 27, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/A6L9-8Z5V] (archived Aug. 27, 2017). However, more recent news
sources have continued to report that the two Trumps have disengaged from running
the day-to-day affairs of their businesses and have, instead, remained tied to them via
their ownership stakes and through revocable trusts that grant them a great deal of
discretion in terms of re-inserting their authority whenever they choose to do so. See
Derek Kravitz & Al Shaw, Trump Lawyer Confirms President Can Pull Money From
His Businesses Whenever He Wants, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 4, 2017, 5:53 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/trump-pull-money-his-businesses-whenever-hewants-without-telling-us (last visited Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cclS46T-S32C]
(archived Aug. 27, 2017) (revealing that President Trump can withdraw funds from his
revocable trust at any time without disclosing those withdrawals, which is yet another
indication of his continuing connection to his business empire); Venook, supra note 11
(indicating ethical concerns over the President's continuing connections to his many
businesses and expressing concern over how these connections may improperly
influence Presidential policy); Jackie Wattles & Jill Disis, Ivanka Trump's Firm Seeks
New Trademarks in China, Reviving Ethical Concerns, CNN (June 5, 2017, 3:12 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/04/news/ivanka-trump-chinese-trademarks/ (last visited
Aug. 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6KT2-E7V2] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (stating that,
despite resigning from her positions within her businesses, she still benefits from them
through her ownership stake in them and her companies, in turn, are positively
influenced by her position in government); see also Editorial Board, Is China Offering
Ivanka
Trump
Unseemly
Favors?,
WASH.
POST
(June
2,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/is-ivanka-trump-receivingunseemly-favors-from-china/2017/06/02/5dfce500-46ef- 11e7-bcde-624ad94170ab
story.html?utm term=.2c8b85el8d7b (last visited Aug. 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
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subsidiaries, the Trump Organization-of which Donald Trump had
served as the Chairman and CEO until just before taking office 1 7
discloses that, in addition to thirty-one domestic subsidiaries, it has
ten foreign subsidiary corporations in eight countries: South Korea,
the United Kingdom, Canada, Panama, the Philippines, India,
Uruguay, and Turkey.' 8
Trump allegedly has created a revocable trust and ceded day-today control of the business operations of the Trump Organization to
his eldest son, Donald J. Trump, Jr., and to the Trump Organization's
chief financial officer, Allen H. Weisselberg.1 9 However, pursuant to
the terms of the trust, while the president will no longer exercise
direct control over his businesses, he "will receive reports on any
profit, or loss, on his company as a whole, [and] can revoke [the
trustees'] authority at any time.

. .

. [T]he purpose of the Donald J.

Trump Revocable Trust is to hold assets for the 'exclusive benefit' of
the president." 20 In addition, Trump continues to be the main "face"
of the Trump Organization in its promotional materials, such as its
website. 21
In connection with this continuing interest in the Trump
Organization, Trump has pledged that the Organization will not
pursue any "new" business ventures overseas during his presidential
term,22 but he has not suggested the Organization will scale back in
any way. To the contrary, developments in the days following
R6RF-XT2L] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (examining whether or not China may be unduly
influencing Ivanka Trump through her company and its trademarks); Jeremy Venook,
The Story Behind Trump's Chinese Trademark, ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/02/trump-chinese-trademark/

517458/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/763L-99S7] (archived Aug. 29,
2017) (detailing the potential influence of China's trademark decision in his favor on
President Trump) [Hereinafter Venook Story]. For a brief overview of the process of
Chinese trademark registration and approval, see Intellectual Property Department,
Trademarks: Application Process, GOVERNMENT

OF

THE

HONG

KONG

SPECIAL

ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, http://www.ipd.gov.hk/eng/intellectual-property/trademarks/
application-process.htm (last updated Feb. 20, 2017) (last visited Aug. 26, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/9DB7-T4AQ] (archived Aug. 26, 2017).
Craig & Lipton, supra note 10.
17.
18.
Uniworld Document, supra note 16; see also James Hill, A Look Inside
Trump's Global Business Interests, ABC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2017, 1:03 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/inside-trumps-global-business-interests/story?id=
44416694 (last visited Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/K26Z-EW4U] (archived Aug. 27,
2017) (listing international interests in these same eight countries).
19.
Craig & Lipton, supra note 10.
20.
Id.
21.
Trump Website, supra note 11.
22.
See Donald Trump's News Conference: Full Transcript and Video, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/1 1/us/politics/trump-pressconference-transcript.html?-r=0&mtrref= (subscription required) (last visited Aug. 29,
2017) [https://perma.ccMV3V-JZRV] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (Trump explaining his
"no conflict of interest provision as president" and turning down a large deal in the
Middle East) [hereinafter Donald Trump's News Conference].
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Trump's pledge suggest that it "leave[s] plenty of wiggle room."23 Just
three days after he held a press conference in which he stated his
companies would not pursue new overseas investments during his
term of office, 24 it was reported that "[t]he Trump Organization will
press ahead with multimillion-dollar plans to expand one of the [US
President's] golf resorts in Scotland."25 The Trump Organization
argued that this project "did not conflict with [Trump's] promise not
to pursue new or 'pending' deals outside the US," because the
implementation of "future phasing of existing properties does not
constitute a new transaction." 26 The scope of the project is enormous,
to include a second eighteen-hole golf course, as well as "a new 450room five-star hotel, timeshare complex and private housing
estate."2 7
B.

Other InternationalBusiness Interests of Donald J. Trump

While the Trump Organization has a number of significant real
estate holdings and is frequently characterized as a real estate
business, its most significant asset is likely its intellectual property.2 8
Even before Trump expressed aspirations to hold a high public office,
he licensed his name to other real estate projects.2 9

23.
Venook, supra note 11, at Those Expansion Plans (discussing Trump's plan
and the room for expansion within the United States).
24.
See Donald Trump's News Conference, supra note 22.
25.
Severin Carrell, Trump's Scotland Golf Resort Proceeds with Expansion
Despite Business Pledge, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 14, 2017,
11:22 AM),
https://www.theguardian.comus-news/2017/jan/14/trump-scotland-golf-resort-conflictsof-interest?CMP~sharebtntw (last visited Aug. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cclY57LCWYW] (archived Aug. 26, 2017).
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
International real property holdings in which the Trump Organization has
maintained a managerial role have had significant problems. For instance, the first
Trump branded international hotel, the Trump Ocean Club in Panama City, "began to
unravel" soon after its 2011 opening. See Noah Kirsch, Inside the Chaos at Trump's
Panama City
Ocean
Club,
FORBES
(Mar.
20,
2017,
7:45
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/noahkirschl2017/03/20/inside-the-chaos-at-trumpspanama-city-ocean-club/#76751681bdcb
(last
visited
Aug.
27,
2017)
[https://perma.cc/8L5T-MKWK] (archived Aug. 27, 2017). In 2013, the "Trump
Organization's Panamanian partner . . . filed for bankruptcy. Building occupants later
reportedly tried to get the Trumps removed from their management role. Amid the
dispute, the Trumps cut internet and phone service at club offices . . . and filed an
arbitration suit at the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris seeking a reported
$75 million in damages. The outcome of the case has not been made public." Id.
29.
See Aaron Williams & Anu Narayanswamy, How Trump has Made Millions
by Selling His Name, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/world/trump-worldwide-licensing/
(last
visited
Aug.
29,
2017)
[https://perma.ce/3SBP-2JTQ] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (describing various licensing
agreements Trump has made world-wide before running for President).
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These branding ventures, in which a developer licenses the
Trump brand and attaches it to a project with no additional
connection to Trump or his companies, include a number of different
projects around the world. Examples include:
*
*
*

A Trump-branded
office building in Buenos Aires,
Argentina;3 0
Several Trump-branded residential complexes and an office
building in five different Indian cities;3 1 and
Two Trump-branded golf clubs-the Trump International
Golf Club and The Trump World Golf Club-in Dubai. 32

These branded properties all predated Trump's run for office.
Now that he is a world leader, the value of his brand has likely
increased.33 Obviously, there are certain financial benefits that may

30.
Allegra Kirkland, Why Trump Trained His Eye on a New Building Project
in Buenos Aires, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Nov. 21, 2016,
5:21 PM),
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/trump-yy-development-group-projects-buenos-airesuruguay (last visited Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/RWJ7-UXRA (archived Aug. 27,
2017) (describing how, in early 2016, "the Trump family entered discussions with YY
Development Group, an Argentine developer, to license its name for Trump Office
Buenos Aires,' a luxury office building"); Peter Schroeder, Report: Trump Pressed
Argentina's President About Stalled Building Project, THE HILL (Nov. 21, 2016, 12:37
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/307050-report-trump-pressed-foreign-buildingPM),
2017)
(last
visited
Aug.
28,
project-in-congratulatory-phone-call
[https://perma.cc/6WLU-5AL7] (archived Aug. 28, 2017) ("According to a report in the
Argentine paper La Nacion, when President Mauricio Macri called Trump to
congratulate him on winning the election, Trump used the opportunity to urge him to
clear the way for a stalled office building development.").
Five Ongoing Realty Projects in India with Trump Organization Tie-Ups,
31.
EcoN. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2017, 10:44 AM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
wealth/real-estate/donald-trump-just-the-name-is-enough-for-indian-real-estate
articleshow/56390279.cms (last visited Aug. 26, 2017) [https://perma.ccl9GSF-HNPY]
(archived Aug. 26, 2017) (reporting on Trump projects in India and noting that "India
only gets the Trump brand and not his money" because the "Trump Organization has
brand-licensing agreements with local developers but made no equity investments....
Without investing a single penny in Indian real estate, Trump Organization can make
millions in just licensing fees").
32.
Venook, supra note 11, at That Emirati Businessman (describing "Sajwani
as a 'billionaire developer in Dubai' who has 'paid Trump millions of dollars to license
the Trump name for golf courses in Dubai').
33.
Kirkland, supra note 30 (quoting development partner's sense that "the
campaign had made the Trump brand even more high-profile than it was before he
launched a presidential bid"). Of course, it is possible that, at least in some places, the
Trump brand may now be worth less than previously because of the significant
negative view of Trump and his administration held by many around the world. See,
e.g., Athena Jones et al., White House Denies Report Trump Will Delay State Visit to
UK, CNN (June 11, 2017, 12:40 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/1 1/politics/trump-ukvisit/index.html
(subscription
required)
(last
visited
Aug.
27,
2017)
[https://perma.ccfM9DU-G6L9] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) (noting that "Trump has
become increasingly unpopular in Britain" following "[h] is vociferous Twitter attack on
London Mayor Sadiq Khan in the wake of the London Bridge terrorist attack" and that
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flow from this, in the form of increased interest from potential
business partners and higher licensing fees.3 4 In fact, while there are
more corrupt explanations for the decisions,35 one explanation for
China's decisions to grant trademarks to "Trump" brands following
the election and inauguration is more innocuous. Chinese trademark
law requires a brand to have strong name recognition before a mark
can be granted. 36 Thus, Trump's winning the presidency may have
legitimately catapulted his brand into a category suddenly worthy of
Chinese trademark protection.3 7
C. PresidentialBusiness: The Public/PrivateNature of a Headof-State-Owned Enterprise
Even before his election, commentators expressed concerns about
the impact of Trump's businesses on his policy positions. One
columnist noted that, "[i]n a Twitter post on Feb[ruary] 24, 2015
Trump wrote, 'I have a lawsuit in Mexico's corrupt court system that
I won but so far can't collect. Don't do business with Mexico!' and
asked whether "a candidate who tweeted 'Don't do business in
Mexico!' shortly before he launched his presidential bid [can] have an
open mind about U.S.-Mexican ties."3 8

"opposition Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn voiced his support for canceling Trump's
[state visit]"); Tracy Watkins & Stacey Kirk, Bird-flipping Welcome for U.S. Secretary
of State Rex Tillerson in New Zealand, STUFF (June 6, 2017, 5:14 PM),
http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/93382262/
birdflipping-welcome-for-ussecretary-of-state-rex-tillerson-in-new-zealand
(last
visited
Aug.
29,
2017)
[https://perma.ce/QW6G-XM7N]
(archived Aug. 29, 2017) (discussing Trump's
unpopularity in New Zealand and the resistance shown to the visit of Secretary of
State Rex Tillerson).
34.
For example, membership fees to join Trump's country club, Mar-a-Lago,
have doubled since he was elected President. See Robert Frank, Mar-a-Lago
Membership Fee Doubles to $200,000, CNBC (Jan. 25, 2017, 3:47 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/25/mar-a-lago-membership-fee-doubles-to-200000.html
(last visited Aug. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cc/872L-3FRU] (archived Aug. 26, 2017)
("People close to the Florida resort said the increase took effect Jan. 1.").
35.
See Venook Story, supra note 16 & accompanying text (discussing China's
influence on the Trump family through trademarks).
36.
See Trademarks [FAQs], CHINA IPR (last updated Aug. 30, 2017),
http://www.china-iprhelpdesk.eulcontent/trademarksfaqs (last visited Aug. 29, 2017)
[https://perma.ccXU2K-7XXN] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (explaining the procedure for
obtaining a well-known trademark in China).
37.
See Editorial Board, supra note 16 (discussing China's influence on Ivanka
through trademarks for her company); Trademarks [FAQs], supra note 36 (explaining
the requirements for a well-known trademark in China); Venook Story, supra note 16
(discussing China's influence on President Trump through Chinese trademark law).
Thanks to Professor Nicholas Howson for making this point during the Symposium
panel in which a prior version of this Essay was presented.
38.
Andr6s Oppenheimer, Is This The Real Reason Trump Holds Grudge
Against
Mexico?,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Apr.
22,
2016,
4:00
AM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/
news/locallnews-columns-blogs/andres-
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Concerns like these crystallized almost as soon as Trump won
the November election, as reports emerged that Trump might be
using his victory to further his business interests. Relatedly, there
were rumors and concerns that his personal business interests might
be informing his diplomatic and early policy decisions.
For instance, one of the first congratulatory phone calls that
Trump received after his election victory was from Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan. It was reported that during their
conversation, Trump took the opportunity to talk up his business
partners in Turkey. "According to the Huffington Post, while on the
line with Erdogan, Trump relayed praise for the leader from Mehmet
Ali Yalcindag, whose father-in-law, Aydin Dogan, owns the holding
company that operates the Trump Towers in Istanbul."3 9
In the days following the election, reports claimed that Georgia
and Argentina suddenly green lighted other Trump-branded overseas
projects. The first involved a project in the former Soviet Republic of
Georgia that "[had] been in the works in the seaside resort city of
Batumi since 2010, was initially scheduled to break ground in 2013,
but [had] been in stasis" since then-possibly because of "the 2013
electoral defeat of President Mikheil Saakashvili, a friend of Trump's
and a supporter of the deal." 40 Likewise, "the local developer of a
Trump Tower planned for Buenos Aires announced [in midNovember], three days after Trump spoke with Argentina's president,
that the long-delayed project was moving ahead."4 1
Other early meetings with politicians gave rise to reports that
Trump was using his new position to lobby for issues related to his
business interests. For instance, shortly after winning the election,
Trump met with UK Independence Party leader Nigel Farange,
whom he reportedly "discouraged . . . from supporting offshore wind

farms, which Trump believes mar the view from one of his coastal

oppenheimer/article73214132.html# storylink=cpy (last visited Aug. 27, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/4RQ6-VRR4] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).
Venook, supra note 11, at That Phone Call with Erdogan.
39.
40.
Id. at That Property in Georgia (noting that, although "green-lighting of the
Trump property in Batumi has not been linked to a specific conversation with Georgian
leaders . . . . numerous public statements in the days since suggest that Trump's
election was a major factor, including an interview with a real-estate entrepreneur who
said, 'Cutting the ribbon on a new Trump Tower in Georgia will be a symbol of victory
for all of the free world."'); Rosalind S. Helderman & Tom Hamburger, Trump's
Presidency, Overseas Business Deals and Relations with Foreign Governments Could
All
Become
Intertwined,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
25,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-presidency-overseas-business-dealsand-relations-with-foreign-governments-could-all-become-intertwined/2016/11/25/
d2bc83f8-bOe2-11e6-8616-52bl5787add-story.html?utmterm=.2f5c6bbfbdd3
(last
visited Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/E7B9-MNTG] (archived Aug. 27, 2017)
(discussing Trump's projects moving forward in Georgia and Argentina).
41.
Helderman & Hamburger, supra note 40.
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properties in Scotland." 42 Still other business-oriented diplomacy
occurred after Trump's election, including allegedly pressuring the
Ambassador of Kuwait to hold its Embassy's annual independence
day celebration at the Trump International Hotel in Washington,

D.C.:4 3

The potential impact of his international business holdings may
be playing a role in the executive decisions made since Trump
assumed the presidency. 44 For instance, it was noted that the first
executive order imposing travel restrictions on persons holding
citizenship in certain Muslim-majority states included only countries
in which Trump apparently has no business interests-but left out
states with "deep-seated ties to terrorism" in which he has business
interests (and included others without such "deep-seated ties" in
which he has no such interests). 45 Likewise, almost immediately after
Trump publicly affirmed his commitment to the "One China" policywhich had been in question since he took a call from the leader of
Taiwan soon after his election-Trump's application to trademark his
name in China was approved after more than a decade of hold-ups in
court. 46 As The Atlantic noted about the timing of the two and the

42.
Elise Viebeck, Trumpt Tweets that He Will Hand Over Control of
Businesses
to
Sons,
CH.
TRIB.
(Dec.
13,
2016,
12:47
AM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ nationworld/politics/ct-trump-business-conflicts20161212-story.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cc/J9XL-WJV5]
(archived Aug. 26, 2017); see Donald Trump's New York Times Interview: Full
Transcript, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/23/
us/politics/trump-new-york-times-interview-transcript.html
(subscription required)
(last visited Aug. 28, 2017) [https://perma.cclXW2K-B46Z] (archived Aug. 28, 2017)
(mentioning Trump's golf courses in relation to energy and environmental policy);
Danny Hakim & Eric Lipton, With a Meeting, Trump Renewed a British Wind Farm
Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/business/witha-meeting-trump-renewed-a-british-wind-farm-fight.html?_r=0 (subscription required)
(lasted visited Aug. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cc/Z9HD-XWUN] (archived Aug. 26, 2017).
43.
See Venook, supra note 11, at That Kuwaiti Event ("[O]riginally scheduled
to take place at the Four Seasons Hotel in Georgetown; the location was allegedly
changed after members of the Trump Organization contacted the [Kuwaiti]
ambassador.").

44.
In addition to decisions based on his own holdings, President Trump also
used the official presidential Twitter account to share his message slamming
Nordstrom from treating his daughter "unfairly" after it decided to stop carrying her
eponymous retail clothing line. See Ivanka Trump Tweets, supra note 9. Potential
impacts on family members' business opportunities appears to be a significant aspect of
the Trump presidency generally. See, e.g., Melania Trump Lawsuit, supra note 3.
45.
See Sommerfeldt, supra note 3 ("[S]ome Muslim countries were spared from
the order's blacklist, even though they have deep-seated ties to terrorism.
Conspicuously, Trump doesn't hold any business interests in any of the countries on
the list, but holds major stakes in several of those excluded from it, records show.").
46.
Venook Story, supra note 16. It is not at all clear how linked the two
actually are, but "what the story demonstrates is just how much the president's
financial dealings complicate any understanding of the motivations behind his policy
decisions." See id.
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speculation that a quid pro quo might have been involved: "Whether
on purpose or by mere coincidence, the outcome of a decade-long legal
dispute is now inextricably linked, in the public imagination if not in
fact, to a high-profile question of international diplomacy." 47
D. Overseas Lawsuits Against Trump and His Business
Enterprise
The international scope of his business interests, the frequency
with which he engages in litigation, and the branded nature of his
holdings all suggest that Trump is uniquely likely to be the subject of
lawsuits while serving as a head of state. Any of the above described
projects, which have been the subject of public/private discussions
between Trump and other world leaders, could become the subject of
litigation. Trump might also be a target for lawsuits, with or without
merit, because of his unpopularity in many countries around the
world. 4 8
Foreign lawsuits against Trump and/or his business are not just
hypothetical. Unhappy investors recently named Donald Trump as a
defendant after they reportedly lost millions of dollars in connection
with the Trump International Hotel and Tower in Toronto-a
development that licensed the Trump brand name. 4 9 In particular,
investors who lost their money claim they were misled into believing
that Trump was building the hotel based on the fact that Trump's
name was "splashed all over the marketing. . . . [The plaintiffsinvestors] thought he was building the hotel, because he certainly
gives you the impression that . . . [it is] his hotel."5 0 A Canadian
appellate court ruled in October 2016 that, while some claims against

Id.
47.
See, e.g., Alexis Flynn, Trump Loses Battle to Stop Wind Farm Near His
48.
Scottish Golf Resort,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Dec.
16,
2015,
11:19
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-loses-battle-to-stop-wind-farm-near-his-scottishgolf-resort-1450275439 (subscription required) (last visited Aug. 26, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/992X-GVSH] (archived Aug. 26, 2017) (describing disdain for Trump
in the UK following campaign remarks about banning Muslims from entering the U.S.
leading to, inter alia, "Britons petitioning lawmakers to hold a parliamentary debate on
whether to ban the businessman from entering the U.K, on the grounds that he incited
hate").
49.
See Jackie Northam, Trump Tower in Toronto Is Up for Sale and Facing
Legal Woes, NPR (Feb. 8, 2017,
4:33 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/
parallels/20 17/02/08/513946283/trump-tower-in-toronto-is-up-for-sale-and-facing-legalwoes (subscription required) (last visited Aug. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/SJF6-T63K]
(archived Aug. 27, 2017).
50.
Id. In fact, "Trump has no ownership stake in the Toronto building,"
although "the Trump Organization[] has a long-term management contract for the
property, and Trump licenses his brand - his name - for a fee." Id.
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Trump were properly dismissed, others-"based on oppression,
collusion, or breach of fiduciary duties"-could proceed."
Similarly, a large group of "would-be condo buyers who lost
millions of dollars" sued Trump when a Trump-branded luxury
condominium project was slated to be built in Mexico but never got off
the ground. 52 While Trump settled the suit, other potential plaintiffs
may still have claims related to the same fraud allegations in the
earlier suit, whichthey could bring in Mexico. One of the investors
(who has yet to bring or settle a claim) gave a lengthy interview not
long ago, in which she alleged that "she used her life savings to pay a
deposit of just over $50,000" and "still wants her money back-with
interest."5 3

III. HEAD-OF-STATE AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOCTRINES

The specter of lawsuits against a head of state in foreign courts
immediately raises the issue of potential claims of immunity. Many
previous authors have done an excellent and thorough job of
expounding upon the historically linked, but now separate doctrines
of sovereign and head-of-state immunity. 54 This Part therefore only
briefly summarizes them before delving into the areas where these
doctrines intersect at least tangentially with potential lawsuits
against Trump and his business enterprise. In particular, this Part
describes aspects of head-of-state immunity law that are amorphous,
under-theorized, subject to disagreement, and likely relevant to
lawsuits against head-of-state-owned enterprises.
The notion that foreign heads of state should enjoy immunity has
ancient roots.55 This doctrine has clearly evolved over time, but

51.
Alastair Sharp, Canadian Court Rules Trump Can Face Claims in Toronto
Tower
Case,
REUTERS
CAN.
(Oct.
13,
2016,
3:07
PM),
http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCAKCN12D2UO?pageNumber=2&virtualBran
dChannel=0 [https://perma.cc/VH8Q-6QKN] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (citing Singh v.
Trump, 2016 ONCA 747, docket number: C60787).
52.
Stuart Pfeifer, Donald Trump Settles Lawsuit Over Baja Condo Resort That
Went Bust, L.A. TIMEs (Nov. 27, 2013, 10:43 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/lafi-mo-donald-trump-settles-baja-mexico-condo-resort-lawsuit-20131127story.html[https://perma.ccDX4N-ZRSE] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
53.
Michael Finnegan, Trump's Failed Baja Condo Resort Left Buyers Feeling
Betrayed
and
Angry,
L.A.
TIMES,
(June
27,
2016,
3:00
AM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-tr-ump-baja-snap-story.html
[https://perma.cc/EZ5D-2YE7] (archived Aug. 28, 2017) (noting also several other
investors who claim to have lost even bigger down payments who did not join in the
now-settled fraud lawsuit).
54.
See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional
Regime of ForeignRelations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 27-28, 134-45 (1999).
55.
Christopher D. Totten, Head-of-State and Foreign Official Immunity in the
United States After Samantar:A Suggested Approach, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 332, 332
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continues to be a part of customary international law, having never
been codified, either in a multilateral treaty or in a US statute. As
discussed in more detail below, the modern contours of the doctrine,
including when and why it should be applied, is an area about which
there continues to be theoretical uncertainty and divergent practice.
In US law, both the concepts of head-of-state and sovereign
immunity are typically traced to the 1812 Supreme Court decision in
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.5 6 The Schooner Exchange is
frequently cited for the proposition that the United States had long
followed the classic absolute immunity approach 5 7 to sovereign
immunity,5 8 though as one commentator points out, "Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion suggests that there are limitations to sovereign
immunity when a foreign sovereign takes on the character of a
private individual."5 9
Though such hints of a more restrictive immunity approach 60
may be gleaned from pre-twentieth century case law and practice, in
fact US courts continued to follow an absolute immunity approach
well into the twentieth century. 6 1 In 1952, Jack B. Tate, then-Acting
Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State, wrote a letter setting
(2011) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, ch. 6, intro. Note (1987)).
56.
Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 147 (1812).
57.
The "absolute" or "classical" approach to sovereign immunity recognizes "no
exceptions save for the consent of the sovereign." Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official
Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51
VA. J. INT'L L. 915, 925 (2011).
58.
Totten, supra note 54, at 338 ("Traditionally, under the theory of absolute
foreign sovereign immunity, states that were sued in US courts made special
appearances to assert immunity, resulting in dismissal of the suit. . . . As early as
1943, the US Supreme Court ruled that a suggestion of immunity from the executive
branch must be accepted by the courts.").
59.
Daniel M. Singerman, Note, It's Still Good to Be the King: An Argument for
Maintaining the Status Quo in Foreign Head of State Immunity, 21 EMORY INT'L L. J.
413, 421 (2007) (citation omitted).
60.
In contrast to the "absolute" approach, "restrictive" immunity means the
recognition of some "explicit exceptions to immunity, especially when sovereigns were
engaged in trade or commerce." Wuerth, supra note 57, at 925.
61.
See, e.g., Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 573 (1926)
(recognizing immunity of a commercial vessel and rejecting the contrary view of the
U.S. Department of State); see also LADY HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY,

201-11, 224-30 (2d ed. 2008) (describing emergence of restrictive immunity approach);
ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW REALLY INTERNATIONAL? 158 (2017) ("Many

states have since moved to adopting the restrictive approach to sovereign immunity,
but China is not one of them."); Ingrid Wuerth, Pinochet's Legacy Reassessed, 106 AM.
J. INT'L L. 731, 736 (2012) (noting that, although "most countries had accepted [the
restrictive] approach [to sovereign immunity]," "China recently made clear that it
adheres to the absolute view"); Wuerth, supra note 57, at 925 n.54 (describing judicial
determination in 1930s and 1940s that courts should henceforth defer to executive
suggestion of immunity) (citing Compaiifa Espafiola de Navegaci6n Maritima S.A. v.
The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1938); Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943);
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945)).
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forth the Department's position that it "would henceforth follow the
more limited form of immunity known as restrictive immunity," 62 a
doctrine that "essentially recognizes the immunity of the sovereign
for public acts but not for private." 63
Initially, the Department continued its prior practice of making
determinations as to whether to recommend immunity in suits
against sovereign states based upon the new Tate formuladeterminations that would then be relied upon by courts to rule on
whether or not to grant immunity. Eventually, however, the
restrictive view was codified by statute in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). 6 4 While the formal legal standard
announced by Tate did not change, the statute shifted the legal
determinations from the executive to the judicial branch. 6 5
The restrictive view of sovereign immunity, described in the Tate
Letter and codified in the FSIA, seeks to balance competing interests.
On the one hand, it recognizes that individuals will seek and should
sometimes be able to access remedies for injuries incurred as a result
of their commercial business dealings with foreign sovereigns. At the
same time, it is mindful that the United States continues to enjoy
judicial immunity sufficient to permit it to engage in the legitimate
public functions of foreign governments without concern for liability.
With the passage of the FSIA and a return of sovereign immunity
determinations to the judicial branch, immunity determinations have
become more uniform and the formal legal analysis of whether and
when an exception to sovereign immunity should be recognized has
deepened substantially. 66
This is particularly true with respect to cases involving the
commercial activity exception to sovereign immunity, which has been
litigated extensively since the passage of the FSIA. In Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,67 the Supreme Court distinguished
between commercial and non-commercial acts, explaining that "when
a foreign government acts, not as regulator of a market, but in the
manner of a private player within it, the foreign sovereign's actions

62.
Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T
OF STATE BULLETIN 984-85 (1952).
63.
Totten, supranote 54, at 339.
64.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611
(2012). See also supranote 14.
65.
Wuerth, supra note 57, at 927-28 (discussing shift from executive to
judicial immunity decisionmaking with the passage of the FSIA).
66.
See also id. at 927 (noting that "the system of executive control [over
immunity determinations] ultimately proved unsatisfactory for several reasons,"
including that the fact that "the State Department sometimes made immunity
determinations that differed from case to case and were inconsistent with its overall
policy").
67.
Rep. of Argentina v. Weltover. Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 607 (1992).
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are 'commercial' within the meaning of the FSIA." 68 Moreover, the
Court went on to clarify that the "nature," and not the "purpose," of
an act determines whether that act is commercial. That is, the Court
held:
[T]he issue is whether the particular actions that the foreign state performs
(whatever the motive behind them) are the type of actions by which a private
party engages in "trade and traffic or commerce." Thus, a foreign government's
issuance of regulations limiting foreign currency exchange is a sovereign
activity, because such authoritative control of commerce cannot be exercised by
a private party; whereas a contract to buy army boots or even bullets is a
"commercial" activity, because private companies can similarly use sales
69
contracts to acquire goods.

Despite the benefits of codification and judicial interpretation, some
commentators have complained that the FSIA is unclear. In
particular, critics charge that it "fails to convincingly define state
'agencies or instrumentalities,' and . . . [that it] is unclear in
explaining when such state agencies or instrumentalities are exempt
from jurisdiction."70
Since the enactment of the FSIA, the doctrine of head-of-state
immunity has emerged as its own distinct category-in both US7 1 and
international law. As a procedural matter, because head-of-state
immunity was not made a part of the FSIA, US courts continue to
look to the State Department for guidance on head-of-state immunity
questions.72 Without suggestions from the executive branch, courts
sometimes independently analyze head-of-state immunity issues. But
the case law is sparse, unlike the significant doctrinal developments
that have occurred since the FSIA's passage.
The doctrine is not clear or uniform across jurisdictions either.
"Although all nations generally agree that heads of state should be
afforded some form of immunity, they disagree as to how far the
immunities should extend and in what circumstances." 7 The fact

Id. at 614.
68.
69.
Id. at 614-15 (citation omitted).
70.
Singerman, supra note 59, at 423.
71.
See Totten, supra note 55, at 337; see also Mark S. Zaid, Sovereign
Immunity: A Comparative Perspective, 88 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 509, 513 (1994)
(discussing how it is not treated as separate under, for example, UK law (citing UK
State Immunity Act of 1978).
72.
Totten, supra note 55, at 342-43; see also, e.g., Yousuf v. Samantar, No.
1:04cv1360 (LMB/JFA), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122403, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 28, 2012)
(ordering, based on the State Department's Statement of Interest, that the defendant
was not entitled to immunity). But see Wuerth, supra note 57, at 923 (arguing that
although, in some cases, courts should apply "very significant deference to the views of
the executive branch," they "should not, however, simply replace generalized executive
branch lawmaking with 'substantial' deference on all issues").
73.
Singerman, supra note 59, at 427.
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that head-of-state immunity remains a creature of both common law
and customary international law reflects this lack of uniformity and
encourages it to persist. 7

IV.

GAPS AND CONFLICTS IN VARIOUS IMMUNITY DOCTRINES

There are many areas of confusion and conflict surrounding the
doctrines of sovereign and head-of-state immunity. A number of these
appear to be particularly salient in light of the types of suits that
could be seen in the Trump era.
First, there are conflicting views as to whether heads of state
should enjoy absolute immunity. In recent years, it has been
contended, the formerly sacrosanct principle has begun to erode,
particularly in the wake of the prosecution of General Augusto
Pinochet, the former ruler of Chile, by the United Kingdom. 75 While
the International Court of Justice recognized shortly after the
Pincohet prosecution that absolute immunity continues to exist under
customary international law vis-a-vis domestic court criminal
prosecutions for sitting heads of state, it acknowledged that a sitting
head of state could be criminally prosecuted in an international
tribunal.76
Indeed, a few years after this decision, the International
Criminal Court (ICC) prosecuted a sitting head of state, Kenyan
President Uhuru Kenyatta, for the first time. President Kenyatta
"handed over power to his deputy, William Ruto, before flying to The
Hague in Holland" to deny and contest charges that he committed

74.
See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010) (characterizing law
applicable to official immunity determinations as the "common law"); Singerman,
supra note 59, at 427 ("[N]o international multilateral treaty codifies head of state
immunity as the VCDR does for diplomatic immunity."); Wuerth, supra note 61, at 738
(footnotes omitted) ("The relatively low number of state parties to these [immunity]
conventions has been attributed to their complexity and to substantive disagreement
about their terms. Customary international law continues to govern this area of law.");
Wuerth, supra note 57, at 962-64 (arguing that the applicable "common law" should be
federal common law interpreted by courts not the executive).
75.
Regina v. Bow Street Metroplitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte
Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 AC 147 (HL) 200; see also Totten, supra note 55, at
366 (describing Spain and Germany also taking aggressive positions with respect to
prosecuting former heads of state and high foreign officials for human rights violations
following Pinochet). But see Wuerth, supra note 61, at 732 (arguing "that under
customary international law as it stands today, there is no human rights or
international criminal law exception . . . to the customary international law of
functional immunity" and noting that "[v]irtually all scholars take the opposite view,
arguing or positing that customary international law recognizes such an exception,
especially in criminal cases").
76.
Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 14).
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"crimes against humanity for his alleged role in unleashing a wave of
post-election violence during 2007-08."7
The ICC prosecuted
Kenyatta over the African Union's strong assertions that sitting
heads of state retain full immunity under customary international
law and that it violates the sovereignty of these officials' home states
to subject them to prosecution while in office. 78
Second, suits (criminal or civil) based on commercial or "purely
private activities" may be an exception to head-of-state immunity.
Then again, they may not. The question is under-theorized and
seldom litigated directly. The idea that private or commercial activity
may constitute an exception to absolute immunity, similar to the
exception contained in the FSIA, is frequently mentioned in
passing.79 However, those making this claim always appear to be
citing others making the same statement-but not cases actually
denying immunity.8 0 To the contrary, to the extent the actual legal

question is decided in such cases, immunity has been granted, never
denied.81
Furthermore, discussions of this concept, though often merging
"private" and "commercial" conduct, often go on to discuss conduct
that is quite different from the types of private commercial conduct
that arise in the sovereign immunity context. For instance, one
author discusses the possible "commercial activity" exception to headof-state immunity by reference to illegal drug trafficking and to other
criminal behavior, such as "ordinary" murder or theft as examples of
"private" acts by a head of state. 82
Occasionally, courts encounter cases involving more mainstream
commercial activity. In Tachiona v. Mugabe,8 3 the Southern District

77.
Owen Bowcott, Kenya's Uhuru Kenyatta Becomes First Head of State to
Appear
Before
ICC,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
8,
2014,
7:47
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/08/kenya-uhuru-kenyatta-head-of-stateicc-hague [https://perma.cc/JC2W-ALQ2] (archived August 28, 2017).
78.
African Union Agrees on ICC Immunity for Heads of State, THE TELEGRAPH
(Oct.
12,
2013,
1:51
AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
africaandindianocean/10374538/African-Union-agrees-on-ICC-immunity-for-heads-ofstate.html [https://perma.cc/AQ6M-QGDU] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).
79.
Even the ICJ has alluded to this possibility in dicta. See Arrest Warrant of
11 April 2000, supra note 76, T 61 (suggesting that former officials might lack
immunity in domestic courts for "acts committed during that period of office in a
private capacity").

80.
See, e.g., Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp.2d 259, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(citing First Am. Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, 948 F. Supp. 1107, 1112-13 (D.D.C.1996) and
Lasidi, S.A. v. Financiera Avenida, S.A., 538 N.E.2d 332, 333 (1989).
81.
See, e.g., Tachiona, 169 F. Supp.2d at 296; Lasidi, 538 N.E.2d at 333 (failing
to note that immunity was ultimately granted in both of these cases despite the
commercial character of the head of state's alleged misconduct).
Totten, supra note 55, at 371-72.
82.
169 F.2d at 259.
83.
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of New York asserted that one reason for an increase in cases against
heads of state following the passage of the FSIA is the fact that, "as
international trade and opportunities to expand wealth in global
markets has continued to expand, more heads-of-state themselves
may be engaging in private foreign investment and commercial
ventures funded by their personal and family fortunes." 84 Yet, in
making this argument, the court apparently found no actual cases in
which such immunity was set aside based on a commercial activity
exception. To the contrary, the one reported case to which the Mugabe
court cited in this section of the opinion involved a sitting head of
state who was deemed entitled to immunity in a case involving
allegations that "defendants [including H.H. Sheikh Zayed, the
sitting head of state of the United Arab Emirates], as senior officers,
managers, agents and nominees for the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International .

.

. illegally and secretly sought to acquire

ownership and maintain control of First American Corporation." 85
Third, even beyond the question of whether a "commercial
activity" exception might apply to sitting (or former) heads of state,
the contours of the commercial activity exception to sovereign
immunity are themselves uncertain. While the standard established
in Weltover is reasonably easy to state,8 6 what constitutes a "private
person" commercial activity versus activity that intersects
commercial activity and "traditional" public functions is not always
easy to discern in practice.8 7 While certain categories of cases clearly
constitute commercial activity, other governmental activities that
involve commercial conduct do not fall clearly on one side of the fuzzy
borders surrounding the commercial activity exception; ultimately,
the determination is a factual inquiry and continues to be "one of the
most frequently litigated" provisions of the FSIA.8 8

84.
Id. at 278 (citations omitted).
85.
First Am. Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, 948 F. Supp. 1107, 1107, 1112 (D.D.C. 1996).
86.
See, e.g., Singerman, supra note 59, at 422.
87.
See Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 507 U.S. 349, 358 n.4 (1993) (holding that a
connection between sovereign and commercial activities did not trigger the FSIA
exception if the claim itself can be said to rest "entirely upon activities sovereign in
character").
88.
Crowell & Moring, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-2014 Year in
Review, 22 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 141, 157 (2014). For instance, as Crowell & Moring's
2014 Annual Review of FSIA litigation recounts, a number of cases tested the
"commercial activities" exception that year, see id. at 157-60 - some with quite
surprising outcomes, see, for example, McEachern v. Inter-Country Adoption Bd. of the
Republic of the Phil., 62 F. Supp. 3d 187, 188-92 (D. Mass. 2014) (holding that a
foreign adoption of a child constituted "commercial activity"). Moreover, the
"commercial activity" exception may not be interpreted in other states in precisely the
same manner as the U.S. Supreme Court. For instance, the United Kingdom recently
narrowed their interpretation of a similar exception. SerVaas Inc. v. Rafidain Bank,
[2012] UKSC 40, ¶¶ 30-33 (appeal taken from ECWA). In that opinion, they noted that
other jurisdictions, such as Hong Kong, continue to follow an absolute immunity
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Fourth, the FSIA contains an exception for "rights in
immoveable property" as part of the restrictive view of sovereign
immunity.89 There is even less discussion of this potential exception
in discussions of head-of-state immunity than the little that has
taken place regarding private or commercial activity. To some extent,
this may turn on notions of whether sovereign immunity doctrine
generally should be applied to head-of-state immunity questions.
But, this last point too is highly contestable. There are multiple
rationales for recognizing head-of-state immunity; it serves more
than one purpose, some of which have been more and less important
than others at various points in the doctrine's history.9 0 Some
approaches continue to view the head of state as more or less part
and parcel of the sovereign entity. On this view, head-of-state
immunity may be treated as a form of sovereign immunity, or the
analysis of when to recognize it may be similar to analyses of when to
grant sovereign immunity.91 Others view it as more akin to
diplomatic immunity or a function of diplomatic law.9 2 Here, there
may be less reason to distinguish between private and public acts, at
least while the head of state is in office. Depending on the reasons
why a court recognizes head-of-state immunity, it may or may not
make sense to recognize immunity generally or in a particular case.

approach and do not recognize a commercial activity exception in their own immunity
laws. See id. at ¶29.
89.
Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 551
U.S. 193, 196-97 (2007) (citing FSIA § 1605(a)(4)).
90.
See Michael A. Tunks, Note, Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future
of Head-of-State Immunity, 52 DUKE L. J. 651, 654 (2002) ("Head-of-state immunity
has sought to achieve the goals of both sovereign and diplomatic immunity by (1)
recognizing an appropriate degree of respect for foreign leaders as a symbol of their
state's sovereign independence; and (2) ensuring that they are not inhibited in
performing their diplomatic functions."); see also, e.g., Shobha Verughese George, Note,
Head of State Immunity in the United States: Still Confused After All These Years, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1055, 1061 (1995) (citations omitted) (tracing head of state
immunity back to its origin within the sovereign immunity doctrine when the sovereign
was indistinguishable from that state but also noting that head of state immunity is
sometimes thought to be grounded in principles of comity, with "each state protect [ing]
the immunity concept so that its own head-of-state will be protected when he or she is
abroad"); Singerman, supra note 59, at 418-26 (discussing head of state's dual origins
in sovereign and diplomatic immunity rationales).
91.
See, e.g., Jones v. Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
[2006] UKHL 26, ¶T 89-93,101-02 [20071 1 AC 270 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.)
(distinguishing Pinochet and concluding that the U.K. State Immunity Act of 1978
conferred immunity on both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and on former state officials)
(reported by Elina Steinerte & Rebecca Wallace at 100 AM J. INT'L L. 901, 902 (2006)).
92.
See Singerman, supranote 59, at 423-26; Tunks, supra note 90, at 654-55.

7088

V.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 50:io65

UNCHARTED TERRITORY: NOVEL QUESTIONS SURROUNDING HEADOF-STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE IMMUNITY

The uncertainty surrounding immunity law reflects many things,
not least of which perhaps is the dearth of cases testing many of the
issues. This has the potential to change during the Trump presidency.
The scope of Trump's international business interests, the frequency
with which he engages in litigation, and the disinterest he has shown
so far to disentangle his public and private business suggest that
many of these doctrinal questions may soon come to the fore.
Attempting to reach satisfactory answers about whether and
when immunity should attach to suits against this "head-of-stateowned enterprise" is beyond the scope of this relatively short Article.
Even attempting to identify all of the likely questions that may
emerge is a daunting task. This Part attempts to illuminate a
significant number of possible ones.
One can imagine suits against this "head-of-state-owned
enterprise" brought in several different formats and fora. To the
extent that the lawsuits are similar to those that have been brought
against Trump-the-Businessman in the past, one imagines civil
lawsuits 9 3 targeting what was, before his taking office, clearly private
commercial activity. These suits may be brought against the Trump
Organization or may name Trump himself, as frequently has
happened in part because of the branded nature of many of his
businesses and the frequent allegations that investors fraudulently
were led to believe that Trump would be more involved in ventures in
which they invested than he actually turned out to be.
To the extent that the suits name Donald Trump in his personal
capacity and not just the Trump Organization, a number of questions
about acting head-of-state immunity and its parameters may arise.
Just a few that immediately come to mind: Can Trump be sued as a
defendant in a civil lawsuit while he is in office? Can he be sued for
alleged misconduct that occurs during his time in office even after he
leaves office? Do the answers to the previous questions depend upon
the link between the alleged misconduct and official acts in which he
engages as a head of state? 94 What standards would be used to

93.
One can imagine that certain allegations that frequently have arisen,
particularly relating to fraud, could be criminal activity in some jurisdictions. Or that
mixing his public office and private business could open Trump up to charges of
corruption or other criminal activity, depending on a nation's criminal laws, that would
not have been in play had he engaged in the same conduct as a private citizen dealing
only with other private citizens. However, the notion that Trump might be charged
criminally not only seems significantly less likely, it is much more closely aligned to
existing immunity doctrine and therefore much less likely to raise novel questions.
94.
See Wuerth, supra note 61, at 735 (distinguishing between "[i]mmunity
ratione personae, or status immunity, [which] protects high-level officials from
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determine how close the link must be or whether the function is a
quintessentially sovereign act or not? Is there a "commercial activity"
exception to the head-of-state immunity doctrine and, if so, what are
its parameters?
These questions all appear to be novel, as immunity discussions
around civil suits against sitting heads of state (and former heads of
state for that matter) are exceedingly rare.9 5 Moreover, looking to
cases involving legal standards in closely related areas, such as
diplomatic immunity, may not always be particularly helpful, as the
global reach and potential influence on diplomacy of the "head-ofstate-owned enterprise" that has emerged with Trump's winning
election and taking office feels very different from the alleged private
misconduct with which most diplomats are charged.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Given the novel nature of the enterprise, how courts might treat
immunity claims raised in suits brought against the Trump
Organization (or against Trump-branded businesses in which his
interest is relatively attenuated) is an open question. The Trump
Organization is arguably acting as a "head-of- state-owned
enterprise" precisely because Trump continues to benefit from these
businesses, and they benefit from their association with their
namesake.9 6 While technically they continue to operate as private
businesses, with Trump's ascendancy to the highest executive office,
it is difficult to disentangle them and their business from Trump.
virtually all suits in foreign national courts while they are still in office" and
"functional immunity, or immunity ratione materiae, [which] attaches not to the office
of the individual but to the type of act performed" and "applies only to official, not
private, conduct, and [which] continues to apply after the individual leaves office").
95.
Id. at 740-41 (noting that, despite the possibility that heads of state may
sometimes not be entitled to immunity from civil proceedings, "[clivil proceedings in
national courts against foreign sitting heads of state nonetheless remain rare"). It is
possible that the dearth of civil lawsuits against heads of state reflects the fact that
these officials have only infrequently engaged in private business while in office that
could give rise to such claims abroad. It may also reflect that the possibility immunity
claims will be raised reduces the chances of success in bringing such suits and the costs
of prosecuting them.
96.
Early data suggests a financial boon for affiliated business ventures. See
Jonathan O'Connell, Trump D.C. Hotel Turns $2 Million Profit in Four Months, WASH.
POST. (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-dc-hotel-turns2-million-profit-in-four-months/2017/08/10/23bd97f0-7e02- 1 1e7-9d08b79fl9l668ed-story.html?tid=ssfb&utm-term=.aea529d4e4d
[https://perma.cc/JHT9-A9YU] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (reporting that "Donald
Trump's company turned a $1.97 million profit at its opulent Trump International
Hotel so far in 2017, dramatically beating its [projection of a $2.1 million loss during
the first quarter of 2017] and giving the first hard numbers to critics who charge that
Trump is profiting from his presidency").
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While almost certainly not falling under the technical definition of an
entity covered by the FSIA,9 7 there are reasonable arguments that
might be made in favor of treating this business as an extension of
Trump himself, at least while he is serving as a head of state.
Whether the business qua business could raise his status as
head of state directly, or whether some other category akin to a stateowned enterprise is created, remains to be seen. But courts and other
governmental actors around the globe soon may face these and other
difficult questions.
Of course, only time will tell what types of lawsuits will be filed
against Trump and his business interests, as well as in what
jurisdictions. The unprecedented combination of his extensive
business interests around the globe, the inclination to use his high
office to bolster those interests (and potentially vice versa), and the
frequency with which he engages in litigation mean that President
Trump's term in office is likely to create new precedent in many
areas, particularly immunity law. Whatever one may think of the
propriety, legality, or ethics surrounding the novel integration of the
new President's international business interests and policy agenda, at
the very least it provides an opportunity for immunity law to develop
deeper and more nuanced accounts of many of its principles.

97.

See supra note 14 & accompanying text.
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